Imagine for a moment you are walking in a city park. It is a beautiful sunny day, and there is a slight breeze flowing through the park. You walk along and you see a beautiful tree, with large green leaves. You go up to the tree and feel the bark of the tree and it feels smooth to you. An ant is crawling up the tree, and you notice that it walking along the ridges and valleys of the tree, which to you seem smooth, but to the ant must feel rough. You continue to walk along, and as a jogger passes you, a gust of wind blows. He remarks how chilly the wind is, while you think to yourself that it is in fact quite warm. As you continue to walk, you look up and forward and see a building in the distance. It looks round to you, but you have been there before and know it to be a square one. You continue on and you see a branch from a tree partially in the water, and you remark now it appears bent.
Now one might ask a few questions. Is it really a nice day? Is the breeze just slight? Are the leaves truly green? Is the tree rough or smooth? Is the wind cold or warm? Is the building square or circular? Is the branch really bent? All these questions come to mind, and as such many are left wondering what the true appearances actually are.
These are the questions that scepticism asks of us. It is an exercise in doubt, and it is often used to tear down the dogmas we all have become accustom to. Many of us simply look at the world in this way. There is the external world and in it there are objects. Our minds then look at the objects. Truth then is when our minds are in complete agreement with the view of the objects. Scepticism states however that we are missing one important point. That is between our thought and the objects is our senses. Because the senses are unreliable, we cannot know (or not know) anything about the objects outside our minds. “The Pyrrhonists (sceptics), as Sextus is careful to explain, do not assert that things are inapprehensible. They are not ‘negative dogmatists’: if they do not assert that things are apprehensible, they do not assert that they are inapprehensible either.”[1] It would seem they do not assert anything at all! (This is a good position to take, as you cannot criticize someone that says nothing.)
How is it that scepticism can state that our senses are so unreliable? What is the case that they make? Finally how have philosophers dealt with this form of scepticism.
Scepticism wishes to show us the faults of our senses and perceptions in view of ten modes. We will look at these modes, particularly at the modes as describe by Sextus Empiricus and see how proven or flawed these arguments are.
Summary of First mode: Humans and other animals
Humans and animals have difference perceptions of the world around them. Humans and animals have difference bodies, different modes of reproduction, difference reactions to different compounds and elements, difference degrees of accuracy in senses, etc. A dog for example has a better sense of smell than a human, an eagle has a better sense of sight than a human. Some things are poisonous to some animals, while harmless to another.
How then do we prefer one view to another? Since we also have senses, how can we be sure that our perception of such things is better or greater than that of other animals? Therefore since we are unable to choose between a human perception and that of an animal one, we must then suspend judgment on all our perceptions.
Commentary on First Mode
While on the surface it may seem reasonable to accept the claim given by Sextus and others that no differentiation between animals and humans can be made, flaws can soon be seen in the argument upon closer examination.
In order to validate the premises, one must first know exactly what animal perceptions are, as well as what human perceptions are. How is it then that we know exactly what are animal perceptions? Sextus again does not claim that he knows what animals actually see, feel, etc, but that simply he knows that is it likely animals see things differently. “People with jaundice say that what appears white to us is yellow….Since, then, the eyes of some animals are yellow, of others blood-shot or white or some other colour, it is likely, I think, that their grasp of colours is different.”[2] So while he gives us evidence to believe that this is the case that animals perceive things differently, he does not give us proof that animals do in fact see things differently. So it may be the case that animal perceptions differ from humans, but it may be in fact that they do not. As such this argument seems not actually a proof of scepticism, but just evidence for it. It would seem that for us this is not a good argument, but one must know what the Pyrrhonists see as a good argument.
As is stated in Modes of Scepticism, the Pyrrhonists “do not concern themselves with the soundness of their arguments but with their efficacy. A ‘good’ argument, or the Pyrrhonists, is an argument which works, an argument which is efficacious in producing suspension in judgement.”[3]
Summary of Second Mode: Differences in Humans themselves
Humans all have different view on the same thing. We all come in many different shape and sizes. As well some of us will have physical difference to difference things. Some of us may state that an item of food is rather plain in taste while others may say that it is in fact too salty or spicy. Many of us also like different things. Some of us enjoy reading, others hate it. Some enjoy working outdoors, others indoors. Even the philosophers are subject to this. While all of them claim to use reason, many different philosophers come up with very different dogmas and doctoran. As such, because of the variations between humans is so great, a suspension of judgement must occur.
Also in order for the argument to work, the premises must be true. This would then lead to a contradiction in any sceptical argument (using truth to claim we don’t know the truth).
Commentary of Second Mode
So whereas before the differences in animals (particularly humans and animals) would cause suspension, now we move on to difference between members of the same species (in this case humans). If one looks at the story in the beginning of this paper one can find a classic example. What is the temperature of the wind, if some if feels hot, and to others it feels cold? But as before in the first mode, the premises do not naturally follow from the conclusion. Just because one finds differences does not necessarily mean that one cannot prefer one over the other, and that one cannot find proof or evidence to support one belief over another. Reason and intellect can also be used to find the most likely view, but that will be dealt with in more detail on mode ten.
Summary of Third Mode: Differences between the senses themselves
It is often the case that senses will disagree with one another as to what the true nature of an object actually is. Paintings for example will often appear to have depth when looked at, but when touched will show no depth at all. Perfume will smell wonderful, but will often have an awful taste. Also there is the case for properties of an object beyond our senses. If a blind man is given an apple, how is he to know that the apple not only tastes good, and smells wonderful, but that it is a beautiful red, and that it is shiny under the light. If this is the case, could it then be possible for there to be properties of an object that are beyond our perception. Reason cannot be used to find those other properties, because the intellect will only be able to think about perceptions given to it by the senses. As such we must suspend judgement on the nature of the objects around us.
Commentary on Third Mode
First one must ask if there is any sensation that the senses can share and conflict with one another on any particular property. A perfume as said may smell nice and taste awful, but that does not mean they are in conflict, as one evokes taste, and the other evokes smell. Second is there a reason why one sense may not be given preference to another sense. While they might disagree in some cases, one can use the intellect to see the failing of one sense (in the case of paintings, one can reason that the eyes are under the influence of an optical illusion), and so one could refer to the sense of touch to correct it. One in effect uses reason to judge the raw data of the senses, and does not take the senses at face value.
But what about perceptions of an object beyond the five senses? How does one explain the idea of sight to a blind man, and even if one could, one would still need a man of sight to explain it to those without. It is possible that there are senses beyond the limit of five for humanity, but it is at this point in time we are simply unable to address it.
However even if there are senses beyond the five, it is important to know that it does not prove that the other senses at our disposal are flawed beyond correction.
Summary of Forth Mode: Circumstances
People are often in different states at different times. We are asleep or awake, drunk or sober, drugged, tired, sick, hungry, etc. All of these affect our perceptions of the world around us. Physical differences such as age and size can affect how one will perceive the world. Now one might state why not simply accept a standard as normal and judge from that. That is to say that if something appears different when you are drunk or tired, you simply compare it to its appearance when one is sober and wake, and using the later as a standard, derive the truth. But first how does one choose a standard? “ For just as healthy people are in a state natural for healthy, but unnatural for the sick, so the sick are in a state unnatural for the healthy but natural for the sick.”[4]
Even if one were to chose one as a standard, which one cannot do as you yourself are always in a circumstance or condition of something (you are either asleep or awake, awake being a condition), then one would need to prove that to be true. Then in order to evaluate the proof, he will need to judge it, according to a standard. Then one will need to prove the standard one uses. Hence one is caught in either a circular argument (if one uses the same proof over), or an infinite one.
So again because of the difference perceptions caused by circumstance, one must suspend judgement.
Commentary on Forth Mode
Different states of being will often produce different perceptions of the same objects. Even if one accepts this premises as true, that in it may not lead to scepticism. Some may response that it is simply a matter of relativity, that the perceptions of one state of being are “true”, while in another case “true” for the other case. However it is important to note that the enemy of scepticism is dogma, and relativism is simply another form of dogma in itself. Scientific method could also be used to find the most likely standard as well.
As for the matter of proof, a crucial assumption is made. That in order to judge a proof, you will need another standard (and hence another proof) to judge if it is to be correct. However that does not have to be the case. If one is to examine the proof, one must first find whether or not the proof is consistent within itself (does it contradict itself). If it is logical and rational and no self contradictions are found, and the conclusion does follow logically from the premises, then at the very least one has found a conditional proof (where if the premise or premises are true, then this conclusion must follow from that, and will also be true). If not then one may even have found a sound proof (true premises, true conclusion). One does not need to use other proofs to prove a proof. If not by that method, then by indirect method is also available (prove the negation of a proposition to be inconsistent and self-contradictory to prove the original proposition).
Summary of Fifth Mode: Place, Position, Interval
The object of one’s study will often be found in a variety of places, positions, and in different intervals in time. Such differences will often cause a difference in appearance. As in the example above, the skyscraper appears rounded when afar, but square upon closer inspection. The branch in the water appears to bend, but out of water has no bend. Any person wishing to make a decision on such a state (wanting for example to prefer place, position or interval to another) is under the same burden of proof as stated above in the forth mode. The places, positions and intervals of the object are not the only concern, but as well as the position of the observer as well. As with the previous mode, no preference can be given from one position to another. As such a suspension of judgement must take place.
Commentary on Fifth Mode
Again this mode is very similar to the forth mode. However the primary difference is while the forth mode (and all other modes previous) deal with faults with the observer, the fifth mode deals with faults in the observed. Also while it may appear simple this mode is far more complex that given credit for. Some might even state it deals with three different modes (place, position, interval).
As again with previous modes, no convincing reason is given to accept the conclusion of the argument. While it may be the case that a suspension of judgement could occur, it is equally possible to accept one appearance for another on any number of bases, including one based on relativism, or scientific method.
As for the proof dilemma faced, a previous explanation is given from the mode above.
Summary of Sixth Mode: Mixture
Objects will never appear in their purest form to an observer. Everything is in a mixture with something else, and nothing appears in its purest form. “No external object makes an impression by itself but in every case together with something, and that it is observed as differing in a way depending on this, I think, clear.” [5] Not only does the observed object appear in mixture, but the senses as well are also a mixture themselves. The eyes contain liquids and membranes, the sound in our ears must wind down the passages and channels in our ears (because a noise will sound different in an open space as opposed to a closed one). As for the use of reason, as the data given by the senses is faulty “our intellect will not do so either, especially since its guides, the senses, fail it.”[6] Even within the brain itself, one will find different mixtures. As such because of the failing of both the observed and the observer in the view of mixtures, we must then suspend our judgement.
Commentary on the Sixth Mode
While few of us would doubt that all things do in fact come in mixtures, it is still not clear that the mind in totally incapable of the ability to sort the raw data of the senses, correcting any illusion present. This then goes back to a theory of the function of the mind (one which we had touched on earlier). According to Sextus, the mind is simply a manipulator of the data of the senses. No logical laws are found present within the mind that may be used to correct the senses inaccuracies. If such an object appears so in this mixture, and so in that mixture, could we then not using reason find the true properties and appearances of the object, if not then at least give us a highly probable property of an object?
The contamination of reason itself however is another matter. It is an important fact that “All of Sextus’ main opponents were thoroughgoing materialists.” [7] As such mixtures contaminating the brain (or the heart which is also given as a seat of the intellect) could also have an effect on perceptions as well. Even those of us who would believe the intellect has an immaterial cause will not deny that it is materially dependent. However the problem still exists, could the intellect using logical functions and reason still be unable to find again if not the truth, then a highly probable property of an object?
Summary of Seventh Mode: Quantities
It is the case that many objects will appear to have different properties depending on the different quantities they appear in. “The shavings from a goat’s horn appear white when observed simply, without composition, but when combined in the actual horn are observed as black.”[8] When appearing in small or separate qualities something may appear different in one case, and in large quantities or as a whole object feel different in another.
A good example is things such as drugs. In small doses a drug can be beneficial, in large does it can harm or even kill. Even alcohol, or foods, or almost anything ingested can be good in some qualities, and harmful in others.
As we cannot know the nature of an object then, and we cannot prefer one quantity to another, we must then suspend judgement.
Commentary on Seventh Mode
While good points are made again in this mode, there does not seem to be a need to jump to a suspension of doubt when one is confronted with differences in quantity. It may just as easily lead to relativism as well. Object A in quantity X will appear with property F, or will be harmless, while Object A in quantity Y will appear with property G or will be harmful. Such could be the nature of the object itself, and could easily be accepted as true if not probable.
Summary of Eighth Mode: Relativity
“The Eighth mode is one deriving from Relativity, by which we infer that, since everything is relative, we shall suspend judgement as to what things are independently and in their nature.”[9] Since everything is of a relative nature, and that to know one thing you must compare it to another, it is easy then to state that it we must suspend our judgement of the true nature of things independent on themselves (as it is impossible to see things independently).
Also any object that must refer to another object to support its appearance is untrustworthy, or simply unable to be known.
Commentary of the Eight Mode
While it may seem in many ways the simplest mode, it is actually far more complex then one can give it credit for. Different sceptical philosophers have treated relativity in different ways, as there were a variety of relativity theories put out by different schools of thought. But all seem to sum it up in this fashion. As a matter of fact, it matters little as to which school of relativity they draw such conclusions, because in order to assert that everything is relative would seem like an almost impossible task. One would have to examine every single object within the known universe, and then be able to see that each object cannot exist without a relation to an object. Even assuming that such is the case, the sceptics have used a universally true and known statement to support the fact that nothing can or cannot be known. One must judge that relativity is everywhere in order to suspend judgement. Such a blatant contradiction does not lend much support to the idea of scepticism.
Summary of Ninth Mode: The Common and the Rare
There are many objects that appear often to us, such as the sun every day. There are other things far more rare such as an eclipse of the sun. As such, many people judge that the sun is in truth a plain and normal fact, while an eclipse of the sun is something remarkable and even an omen of sorts. “Earthquakes, too, do not similarly upset people experiencing them for the first time and those who have grown accustomed to them.”[10] Even with things that are valuable, for how valuable would one find gold if it was found lying like rocks on the ground.
As such, because of the differences in options when encountering something often or for the first time/ rarely, we must then suspend judgement as to its true nature.
Commentary on Ninth Mode
As with before, such an argument seems unlikely to lead one to scepticism of all objects, or even the ones dealt within the examples themselves. Are things such as value and shock truly properties of an object? Is it a fact that gold has the properties of weight, density, and value? Could one simply state that this is a property given to it by the observer and not so much a property of the object itself? Could one even go so far as to say that such properties are relative, that to some in certain situations this is valuable, shocking, amazing, etc, while to others it is not?
Summary of Tenth Mode: Customs and Persuasions
This final mode deals more so with ethics and morals than any other mode so far. It is the case that throughout the world many people have different persuasions, laws, customs, myths, and dogmatic suppositions. Persuasions can often be translated as lifestyle or culture in today’s language, and many people act with different persuasions, customs, etc. Laws are written rules that have definable punishment given by the authorities, political or otherwise. Customs are ways in which a group of people decides how act (much a part of culture). Myths are fictions stories that have gain acceptance in a community. Dogmatic suppositions are beliefs that usually have some kind of argument and proof.
Different laws and different beliefs among different geographies are common. Many people believe that there is only one God, and it is the First cause of all. Some believe that there was a first cause God that created many gods, and they in tern created the world, others simply believe in the many Gods, or no God at all. Adultery is against the law in many nations, but in ours while it is frowned upon, no law forbids it (or if there is a law, it is no longer enforced). So great are the differences that one cannot believe in all of them, but must decided between one and the other. As well since no preference can be given to one or the other, we must suspend our judgement.
Commentary on the Tenth Mode
This mode is probably the most common mode one will find in practice today. Even in the time of Augustine, he states in his book the Confessions, that it is the case that many youth believe that moral certainty cannot be found. Today one finds this mode very prevalent, and is often used as an argument against those who speak out against one custom or another.
As with previous modes, this one again does not necessarily lead to scepticism. As one notices today, many people will fall back on relativism itself stating that such and such a custom, belief, etc, is “true” for this person. So the effectiveness of this mode, like all others leave something to be desired.
But is it still fair to say that we must still believe that no arguments can be made for one or the other? Is it the case that one custom cannot be given preference over another?
All customs, persuasions, etc, rely on arguments to support them. Is it not possible to then compare and contrast each custom and persuasion? One must first learn one custom, persuasion, etc, in detail, looking at the arguments for it. Then one must see if it is consistent, or if there are any contradictions in it at all. If not, then one can look in detail at another, doing the same thing as before. Then one could compare the arguments for both, and judge which are more consistent or of greater value.
As such I find that while it may seem convincing on the surface, when looked upon more closely, this mode again fails to induce us to accept scepticism.
Final Statements
One of the biggest and primary failings of the modes of Scepticism are that while many of them may suggest that scepticism is a proper response to the failings of the senses, it is not a conclusion one must derive from them. While no proof of scepticism is possible (because a proof would imply a truth of the universe, resulting in a paradox), evidence is given. The primary reasons for scepticism lie in the failing of the senses and the properties given by the object. However in order for scepticism to be a result, equal weight must be given to one appearance as well as the other.
There is as of yet no reason why in terms of the material world why scientific inquiry will not be able to, if not prove, than at least give a probable answer as to the most likely appearance of an object. While the tower may appear round, using optical science, one can determine the failings of sight as distance grows, so then it would be possible to assume that the closer an object is, the more like a true representation of the object would result. The oar may appear bent in the water, but does that then mean that we are incapable of ever finding out if the oar is truly bent or straight?
Not only that, but the modes of scepticism rely on us accepting as a truth that scepticism is the proper response. Scepticism if it is true cannot support any belief system, even itself.
Finally even if one could state that no truth could come about as a result of the senses, philosophers such as Augustine have said that one does not necessarily need to look at the senses to find truth. Using intelligible method, undeniable truths can be found such as properties of logic (the idea of self-contradiction for example). For example the universe might be finite, or it might have a beginning and no end, have no beginning but an end, or may be infinite, but we know it is one of these. Finally if one examine their own thought one will find the proof for one’s own existence, and according to Plotinus, Augustine and the like, one may even find the proof of a first cause (which some people will attribute the name of God).
Scepticism is a possible conclusion of the modes but it does not have to be. In listening to the challenge of the sceptic we are forced to defend our own beliefs, and maybe even lose some of them in the process, but that does not mean that we must stop our search for truth at scepticism itself. “At the gates of knowledge the sceptic stands guard: Before we can enter the citadel we must answer his challenge.”[11]
Works Cited
Julia Annas and Jonathan Barnes. (1985) The Modes of Scepticism. Cambrige: Cambridge University Press
Sextus Empiricus. (1994) Outlines of Scepticism. Trans. Julia Annas and Jonathan Barnes. Cambrige: Cambridge University Press
[1] Annas, Barnes (1985, 48)
[2] Sextus, Outline of Pyrrhonism 1.44, translated by Annas and Barnes
[3] Annas, Barnes (1985, 50)
[4] Sextus, Outline of Pyrrhonism 1.103, translated by Annas and Barnes
[5] Sextus, Outline of Pyrrhonism 1.124, translated by Annas and Barnes
[6] Sextus, Outline of Pyrrhonism 1.128, translated by Annas and Barnes
[7] Annas, Barnes (1985, 117)
[8] Sextus, Outline of Pyrrhonism 1.129, translated by Annas and Barnes
[9] Sextus, Outline of Pyrrhonism 1.135, translated by Annas and Barnes
[10] Sextus, Outline of Pyrrhonism 1.141, translated by Annas and Barnes
[11] Annas, Barnes (1985, 5)